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Abstract
The theory of discrete-time online learning has been successfully applied in many
problems that involve sequential decision-making under uncertainty. However,
in many applications including contractual hiring in online freelancing platforms
and server allocation in cloud computing systems, the outcome of each action
is observed only after a random and action-dependent time. Furthermore, as a
consequence of certain ethical and economic concerns, the controller may impose
deadlines on the completion of each task, and require fairness across different
groups in the allocation of total time budget B. In order to address these ap-
plications, we consider continuous-time online learning problem with fairness
considerations, and present a novel framework based on continuous-time utility
maximization. We show that this formulation recovers reward-maximizing, max-
min fair and proportionally fair allocation rules across different groups as special
cases. We characterize the optimal offline policy, which allocates the total time be-
tween different actions in an optimally fair way (as defined by the utility function),
and impose deadlines to maximize time-efficiency. In the absence of any statistical
knowledge, we propose a novel online learning algorithm based on dual ascent
optimization for time averages, and prove that it achieves O˜(B−1/2) regret bound.
1 Introduction
With the prevalence of automated decision methods and machine learning methods, it is important to
analyze the impact of learning and evaluate models not only with respect to traditional objectives
such as reward or model accuracy, but also to account for the impact on individuals that interact with
the system. Indeed, there are many studies highlighting algorithmic discrimination due to problems
in the machine learning pipeline: imbalance in data [1], learnt representations [2, 3], choice of model
proxies [4], demographic group-dependent difference in error rates of the learned models [5, 6, 7],
to name a few. With rising ethical and legal concerns, addressing such issues has become urgent,
specially as these impact critical societal decisions involving job opportunities and hiring. In 2014, it
was estimated that 25% of the total workforce in the US was involved in some form of freelancing,
and this number was predicted to grow to 40% by 2020 [8]. In reality, this percentage might be
much higher, due to COVID-19 restrictions leading to increased work-from-home and changes in
job opportunities [9, 10]. In online platforms however, there has been a strong evidence of bias
observed in number of user reviews and user ratings3 on completing jobs with significant correlations
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3The mean (median) normalized rating score for White workers was 0.98 (1), while it is 0.97 (1) for Black
workers on TASKRABBIT. The mean (median) rating of White workers was found to be 3.3 (4.8), 3.0 (4.6) for
Black workers, 3.3 (4.8) for Asian workers, 3.6 (4.8) for workers with a picture that does not depict a person,
and 1.7 (0.0) for workers with no image on FIVERR [11].
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Figure 1: Freelancer profiles on UPWORK with their past performance and corresponding reviews for “fixed-
price" contracts. Contractors can access these profiles and allocate fixed-timed contracts with deadlines.
with race, gender, location of work and length of profiles4 [11]. Motivated by these problems in
online contractual hiring, we study a theoretical framework for sequential resource allocation to
workers, where the controller (decision maker) can enforce deadlines for each task’s completion. Our
key contribution is to quantify impact of reward maximization in terms of equality of opportunity
for jobs and develop algorithms that can achieve a meaningful trade-off between these via online
utility maximization. The challenge is to maximize total reward within a given time budget, while
accounting for random completion times by workers from different groups and fairness in allocation.
Formally, we consider K groups of individuals who can be hired sequentially for each task, i.e.,
at any point, exactly one individual can be hired. If an individual from group k ∈ [K] is chosen
for the n-th task and given a contractual deadline t by the controller, he/she generates a random
reward of Rk,n if the task is completed by (random) time Xk,n within deadline t. If the task is
not completed by the deadline, the reward obtained by the controller is zero and the time until the
deadline is wasted (i.e., yields 0 reward for the controller). Completion times and reward distributions
are assumed group-dependent and i.i.d. across tasks. The objective of the controller is to maximize
utility (trade-off between total reward and fair allocation) in the offline (known distributions) and
online settings (unknown distributions) under a budget constraint on time. As we will show in this
paper, controlled deadlines set are essential for optimal time-efficiency under the budget constraint.
The ethical problems we are concerned with involve the rate of jobs allocated to different demographic
groups and the deadlines imposed on these under reward maximization regimes [11]. Our sequential
framework would also apply to other settings, for e.g., comparative clinical trials with varying
follow-up durations as well as to server allocation in cloud computing where jobs are drawn from
different application groups and must commit computational resources until a specific amount of time
due to service level agreements (Section 2). We will often focus on the first application involving
online contractual hiring, since fairness concerns are most naturally motivated in this domain.
Given a time budget constraint B and the diverse random nature of completion time and reward pairs,
the main question we consider is how to decide distribution of tasks and deadlines between different
groups of people. Two potential extreme allocations are: (i) Reward-maximizing task allocation: The
controller assigns all tasks to the most rewarding group to maximize the total reward within the given
time budget. The other groups do not get any chance to receive tasks. (ii) Proportional task allocation:
The controller completely ignores the reward distributions, and attempts to give equal time share
to each group. In other words, each group receives a fraction of the tasks inversely proportional
to their mean completion times. There is clearly a trade-off between the reward maximization and
equal time-share considerations in continuous-time sequential task allocation, and well-chosen utility
functions [12] can be helpful in modeling this in a unified way. In this paper, we consider a very
general class of utility functions, which recovers broadly used fairness criteria such as proportional
fairness, max-min fairness, reward maximization among many others [13, 14, 12]. The controller
can determine her priorities in terms of notions of fairness and model the task allocation problem by
choosing the utility function accordingly.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1. Incorporation of random completion time dynamics and fairness in allocation: In discrete-
time online learning models, each action is assumed to take a unit completion time, thus the
4Mean (median) number of reviews: for women 33 (11), 59 (15) for men on TASKRABBIT. Mean (median)
number of reviews: for Black workers was found to be 65 (4), 104 (6) for White workers, 101 (8) for Asian
workers, 94 (10) for non-human pictures and 18 (0) for users with no image on FIVERR [11].
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random and diverse nature of task completion times, as required in many fundamental real-life
applications, is ignored. In this work, we incorporate this aspect and develop a sequential learning
framework in continuous time using tools from the theory of renewal processes and stochastic
control. We show how controlled deadlines improve the time-efficiency in continuous-time
decision processes. Moreover, this is the first work, to the best of our knowledge, that analyzes
fair distribution policies in online contractual hiring.
2. Characterization of Approximately Optimal Offline Policies: As a consequence of the random
and controlled task completion times, the optimal policy for fair resource allocation is PSPACE-
hard akin to unbounded stochastic knapsack problems. For tractability in design and analysis, we
propose an approximation to the optimal offline policy based on Lagrange duality and renewal
theory, and prove that it is asymptotically optimal. These approximate policies allocate tasks
independently with respect to a fixed probability distribution.
3. Online learning for utility maximization: For utility maximization in an online setting with full
information feedback, we develop a novel and low-computational-complexity online learning
algorithm based on dynamic stochastic optimization methods for time averages, and show that
it achieves O˜(B−1/2) regret for a time budget B. The optimal offline control policy in this
paper is time-dependent, randomized and attempts to optimize time averages unlike the reward
maximization problems in discrete-time problems. Despite these, the online learning algorithm
we developed adapts to the randomness in completion time-reward pairs, and achieves optimal
performance with vanishing regret at a fast rate.
Related Work: The problem of fair resource allocation via utility maximization has been widely
considered in economics and network management [15, 16, 17, 18]. The utility maximization
approach to fair resource allocation in these papers predominantly deals with discrete-time systems,
therefore the randomness and diversity in task completion times is completely ignored. Furthermore,
these works either assume perfect knowledge of rewards and completion times prior to decision-
making, or they assume the knowledge of statistics, therefore they do not incorporate online learning.
The only continuous-time utility maximization approach to fair resource allocation is [19], which
assumes the knowledge of first-order statistics.
Online learning under budget constraints has been considered under the scope of bandits with
knapsacks [20, 21, 22]. In the classical bandits with knapsacks model, the objective is to maximize
expected total reward under knapsack constraints in a stochastic setting. In [23], an interrupt
mechanism is employed to incorporate the continuous-time dynamics into the budget-constrained
online learning model. Note that these works focus solely on reward maximization, therefore do not
address the fair resource allocation problem. The bandits with knapsacks setting was extended to
concave rewards and convex constraints in [24], which assumes bounded cost and reward, and the
deadline mechanism is not involved in decision-making, thus optimal time-efficiency in continuous
time is not achieved. Our paper deviates from this line of work as it proposes a versatile and
comprehensive framework for fairness, and incorporates continuous-time dynamics into the decision-
making for time-efficiency. We include an extended discussion of related work in Appendix A.
2 Online Learning Framework for Group Fairness
We consider the sequential and fair allocation of tasks to individuals from different groups, whose
completion times and rewards randomly vary. This goal differs significantly from traditional online
learning models that aim to maximize the expected total reward with unit completion times. Under
this traditional setting, the controller’s goal is to find and persistently select the reward-maximizing
groups to allocate its tasks. As a consequence, the reward-maximization objective leads to the
starvation of suboptimal groups, which causes unfairness amongst the groups with different statistical
characteristics. Next, we provide a few motivating examples with group fairness requirements:
• Contractual Hiring in Online Freelancing Platforms: Online freelancing sites like UPWORK
host contractual workers (freelancers) that can be hired by “contractors" who require specific tasks
to be completed. Each freelancer has a profile and performance on past tasks that can be learned by
the contractors via ratings and reviews (see, typical profile in Figure 1). Fixed-timed contracts are
popular on UPWORK, wherein contractors enforce a deadline by which the task must be completed
otherwise the contract is terminated (i.e., there is no payment). Contractors can browse profiles
and post a job to a selected set of freelancers with a deadline. However, there is a large literature
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documenting bias in online rating systems, which in turn impact job opportunities disparately
[11, 25, 26], thus making it critical to develop theory of online learning for such settings.
• Server Allocation in Cloud Computing: An important application of our framework is online
learning for fair resource allocation in cloud computing systems. In a very basic setting, a single
server is sequentially allocated to tasks from one of K user groups, which exhibit similar execution
time statistics and priority levels within each group. In many practical scenarios, the execution time
of a task is unknown at the time decision [27, 28], and exhibits a power-law behavior [29], which
necessitates a deadline mechanism for optimal time-efficiency [23]. In this setting, the objective of
the controller is to allocate the server in an optimally fair way across the groups in a given time
interval [0, B], depending on the completion time statistics and priority levels. Our work proposes
a versatile framework to model fairness for this problem based on the concept of continuous-time
utility maximization, and develops online learning algorithms to achieve the optimal performance
with low regret in the absence of any statistical knowledge.
More examples can be found in other domains, including multi-user wireless communication over
fading channels (e.g., see [23]), comparative clinical trials with optimal follow-up duration (e.g., see
[30, 31]), whereby the goal is to fairly share the limited resources between groups of users.
Motivated by these examples, next we introduce an online learning framework that expands the
traditional setting substantially to incorporate group fairness characteristics into its formulation.
Suppose that there are K ≥ 1 groups of individuals that are available for serving tasks with different
(and unknown) statistics. Specifically, if an individual from group k ∈ [K] = {1, 2, . . . ,K} is
chosen for the n-th task, he/she takes Xk,n units of completion time for successful completion, and
a reward of Rk,n(t) = Rk,nI{Xk,n ≤ t} is obtained t time units after the initiation where Rk,n is
a positive random variable and Rk,n(t) ∈ [0, Rmax(t)] a.s. for some finite constant Rmax(t) > 0.
Thus, the random reward Rk,n is gathered only if the task is completed. For example, in the
server allocation application, a group-k task of random size Rk,n yields a reward (throughput)
Rk,n(t) = Rk,nI{Xk,n ≤ t} only upon successful completion. We assume that (Xk,n, Rk,n(t))
is independent and identically distributed (iid) over n, and independent across different groups k.
Note that the completion time Xk,n and reward Rk,n can be correlated, for example, in the server
allocation example, the completion time Xk,n and size Rk,n of a task are positively correlated [32].
We assume that each task has a positive completion time, i.e., Xk,n > 0 almost surely for all k, n.
Before the n-th task begins, the controller makes two decisions: the group Gn ∈ [K] of the individual
that will be assigned the task, and a deadline Tn ∈ T, where T ⊂ R+ is the decision set. If the task is
not completed by the selected deadline, the service is interrupted without collecting any reward. In
many applications, the deadlines are chosen within a discrete set (e.g., days/months in contractual
hiring or time-slots in server allocation), thus we assume a finite decision set T = {t1, t2, . . . , tL}
with tl <∞ for all l in this paper. The sequential task allocation continues until a given time budget
B > 0 is exceeded, therefore, the completion time of a task is as important as the reward.
To describe this process mathematically, letHk,n−1 denote the available feedback for group k, and
Hn−1 = ∪k∈[K]Hk,n−1 denote the history before making a decision for task n. For a given time
budget B > 0, a causal policy pi = {pi1, pi2, . . .} sequentially makes two decisions pin = (Gn, Tn) ∈
[K] × T for each task n based on the history Hk−1, where Gn is the chosen group and Tn is the
assigned deadline. Under a policy pi, the number of initiated tasks is the following first-passage time:
Npi(B) = inf
{
n :
n∑
i=1
min{XGi,i, Ti} > B
}
, (1)
which is a random and controlled stopping time. Moreover, the reward rate of any user type k is:
rpik (B) = E
[ 1
B
Npi(B)∑
n=1
I{Gn = k}Rk,n(Tn)
]
, under policy pi. (2)
IfRk,n(t) = I{Xk,n ≤ t}, i.e., each task completion yields a unit reward, then rpik (B) simply denotes
the task completion rate (i.e., throughput) of group k individuals in the time interval [0, B].
Note that designing strategies that aim to maximize the total reward rate in (2) will lead to the
persistent selection of the group with the highest reward rate at the cost of starvation of all the rest
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(see [23]). In order to address group fairness considerations, we propose a continuous-time online
learning framework based on the utility maximization concept that is used effectively in the fair
resource allocation domain (e.g., see [16]). Specifically, for a given continuously-differentiable,
concave and monotonically increasing utility function Uk : R → R, we let the utility of group k
under a policy pi be given by Uk
(
rpik (B)
)
. Then, the total utility under a policy pi is defined as:
Upi(B) =
K∑
k=1
Uk
(
rpik (B)
)
, for time interval [0, B].
The optimum utility over a class of policies Π, and the regret for a given pi ∈ Π are, respectively:
OPTΠ(B) = max
pi∈Π
K∑
k=1
Uk
(
rpik (B)
)
and REGpiΠ(B) = OPTΠ(B)− Upi(B), for B > 0. (3)
Note that, due to the monotonically increasing and concave nature of utility functions, allocating the
tasks always to the most rewarding group is not a good choice, because the same amount of time
could yield a higher utility for another group because of the diminishing return property of concave
functions. A particularly important set of utility functions is captured by the α-fair class, given next.
Definition 1 (α-Fair Allocation). For any given α > 0 and weight wk > 0, let Uk(x) = wk x
1−α
1−α ,
for all k. Resource allocation by using these utility functions is called α-fair resource allocation.
This class is attractive since it includes as special cases proportional fairness, minimum potential
delay fairness, reward maximization and max-min fairness [12].
3 Approximation of the Optimal Offline Policy
Note that a simpler version of the sequential maximization problem in (3) with linear utility functions
over all causal policies is called an unbounded knapsack problem, and it is PSPACE-hard even in the
case of known statistics [33, 20]. Therefore, the optimal causal policy for the problem in (3) has a
very high computational complexity even in the offline setting, which makes it intractable for online
learning. For tractability in design and analysis, we consider a class of simple policies that allocate
tasks in an i.i.d. randomized way according to a fixed probability distribution over groups, and show
its efficiency in this section.
Definition 2 (Stationary Randomized Policies). Let P be a fixed probability distribution over [K]×T.
A stationary randomized policy (SRP) pi = pi(P ) makes a randomized decision independently
according to P for every task until the time budget B is depleted. In other words, under the SRP
pi(P ), we have P
(
pin = (k, t)
)
= P (k, t), ∀n ≤ Npi(B), for all (k, t) ∈ [K] × T. We denote the
class of all stationary randomized policies as ΠS .
Proposition 1 (Asymptotic optimality of SRP). There exists a probability distribution P ? such that
the stationary randomized policy pi(P ?) is asymptotically optimal over all causal policies asB →∞.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix B. In the following, we characterize the total
utility under pi(P ) by providing tight bounds.
Proposition 2. Let P be any given probability distribution over [K]× T. Then, the reward per unit
time for group k under the stationary randomized policy pi(P ) is as follows:
ρk(P ) =
∑
t∈T P (k, t)E[Rk,1(t)]∑
(i,t)∈[K]×T P (i, t)E[min{Xi,1, t}]
,∀k ∈ [K].
Consequently, the total utility under the stationary randomized policy pi(P ) is bounded as follows:∑
k∈[K]
Uk
(
ρk(P )
)
≤
∑
k∈[K]
Uk
(
r
pi(P )
k (B)
) ≤ ∑
k∈[K]
Uk
(
ρk(P )
)
+O
( 1
B
)
.
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We include the complete proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix B. The key idea is that under an SRP,
the total reward of a group k is a regenerative process. Then, by using the theory of stopped random
walks for regenerative processes, the reward per unit time under pi(P ) is found as ρk(P ), and the
upper bound for the total utility is found by using Lorden’s inequality [34] and concavity of Uk.
Proposition 2 emphasizes the significance of the reward per unit time ρk(P ). In conjunction with
Proposition 1, this suggests that using a probability distribution that maximizes the limiting total
utility would be an effective offline approximation.
Definition 3 (Optimal Stationary Randomized Policy). Let P ? be a probability distribution defined
as P ? ∈ arg maxP
∑
k∈[K] Uk
(
ρk(P )
)
. Then, the optimal SRP pi? makes a selection independently
for every task according to P ?: P
(
pi?n = (k, t)
)
= P ?(k, t) for all (k, t) ∈ [K]×T and n ≤ Npi(B).
An interesting question regarding P ? is the choice of deadline policy for each group. The following
proposition characterizes the optimal deadline policy under pi?, and yields a significant simplification
in finding the optimal policy by reducing the size of the search space.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Deadline Policy). For any k, the optimal probability distribution P ? makes
a deterministic deadline decision for group k, that is, |{t ∈ T : P ?(k, t) > 0}| ≤ 1. For any k, we
denote t∗k ∈ T as the (unique) optimal deadline for group k such that P ?(k, t∗k) > 0.
The detailed proof of Prop. 3 can be found in Appendix C. As we will see later, we can explicitly
characterize the optimal deadline for a broad class of utility functions used for the so-called α-fair
allocations. In the following, we use Prop. 2 to characterize the performance of the optimal SRP.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Total Utility). For any group k, let t∗k ∈ T be the (unique) optimal deadline
by Prop. 3; r∗k = E[Rk,1(t∗k)]/E[min{Xk,1, t∗k}] be the reward per processing time for group k; and
ϕk =
P ?(k, t∗k) · E[min{Xk,1, t∗k}]∑
j∈[K] P ?(j, t
∗
j ) · E[min{Xj,1, t∗j}]
, (4)
be the fraction of time budget allocated to group k under pi(P ?). Then, for any SRP pi(P ), the total
utility is bounded as
∑
k Uk
(
ρk(P )
)
≤∑k Uk((U ′k)−1( λr∗k )), where the upper bound is achieved
by the probability distribution that satisfies ϕk = 1r∗k (U
′
k)
−1( λ
r∗k
)
for λ such that
∑
k ϕk = 1.
The proof of Proposition 4 follows from Lagrange duality and Prop. 3, and can be found in Appendix
D. Note that the above analysis is very general in the sense that it holds for any set of utility functions
{Uk : R → R : k ∈ [K]} that are continuously differentiable and concave. In the following, we
apply the results to the class of α-fair allocations (cf. Definition 1) and discuss their implications.
Proposition 5 (α-Fair Resource Allocation in Continuous Time). For any group k, the optimal
deadline is t∗k = arg max
t∈T
E[Rk,1(t)]
E[min{Xk,1, t}] . Also, let r
∗
k = maxt∈T
E[Rk,1(t)]
E[min{Xk,1,t}] be the reward
per processing time and µk = E[min{Xk,1, t∗k}] be the mean processing time for group k. Then, for
any α > 0, we have the following results for α-fair utility functions:
max
P
Upi(P )(B) =
1
1− α
( ∑
k∈[K]
(r∗k)
1
α−1w
1
α
k
)α
, (5)
where the optimum probability distribution P ∗k and the optimum fraction of time budget ϕk allocated
to group k are, respectively, given by:
P ?(k, t) = I{t = t∗k}
w
1
α
k (r
∗
k)
1
α−1/µk∑
j∈[K] w
1
α
j (r
∗
j )
1
α−1/µj
, ϕk =
(r∗k)
1
α−1w
1
α
k∑
j∈[K](r
∗
j )
1
α−1w
1
α
j
,∀k ∈ [K].
To gain a clear understanding of the notion of α-fairness, we consider the following special cases.
Corollary 1. For any given set of parameters {wk > 0 : k ∈ [K]}, we have the following results for
continuous-time α-fair resource allocation problem for various α > 0 values.
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(i) Proportional fairness: In this case, we have limα→1 Uk(x) = wk log(x) for all k. Let µk =
E[min{Xk,1, t∗k}] be the mean processing time for group k. Then, the optimum utility is achieved
by the probability distribution P ?(k, t) = I{t = t∗k} wk/µk∑
j∈[K] wj/µj
, (k, t) ∈ [K] × T, thus we
have ϕk = wk∑
j∈[K] wj
for all k and OPTΠS (B) =
∑
k log
(
r∗kwk∑
k′∈[K] wk′
)
+O( 1B ).
(ii) Reward maximization: If α = 0, we have Uk(x) = ωkx for all k. Let k∗ = arg maxk∈[K] wkr∗k
be the group with highest weighted reward rate. Then, the optimal probability distribution is
P ?(k, t) = I{k = k∗, t = t∗k}, for all (k, t). Thus, OPTΠS (B) = maxk∈[K] wkr∗k +O(1/B).
Remark 1. Note that optimal deadline t∗k for any group k is chosen so as to maximize the reward per
processing time of group k. Under proportional fairness (α→ 1), the controller distributes the time
budget proportional to group weights, i.e., ϕk = wk/
∑
j wk, which reduces to equal time-sharing
under uniform weights. To achieve this, the controller allocates tasks with probability inversely
proportional to the mean processing time µk. Under reward maximization (α = 0), the controller
allocates the entire time budget B to a single group that yields the highest reward per processing time
to maximize the expected total reward, i.e., ϕk = I{k = k∗}. As such, the trade-off between reward
maximization and equal (i.e., reward-insensitive) time-sharing is modeled by α-fairness for any
α ∈ [0, 1). Further, the α-fair utility maximization framework includes max-min fairness (α→∞)
and minimum potential delay fairness (α = 2) as subcases.
4 Online Learning for Utility Maximization (OLUM)
In the previous section, we provided key results on the asymptotically optimal approximations to
the offline utility maximization problem. In this section, we will build on these to attack the online
learning problem for continuous-time fair allocation. In particular, we will propose a novel light-
weight online learning algorithm for the fair resource allocation problem based on Lagrangian duality,
and show that it achieves vanishing regret at rate O˜(B−1/2).
Feedback model: We assume a delayed full-information feedback model where the completion time
and reward of all groups for task n are revealed to the controller at stage n+ τ for some delay τ ≥ 1.
This assumption holds approximately for our target applications. In freelancing platforms, there
are often multiple contractors that hire freelancers for various tasks. It is often possible to get full
information on various freelancers due to employment by other companies and their reviews can
serve as the feedback for the controller. Competitions hosting websites like TOPCODER have also
recently been catering to businesses who need fast-prototyping using freelancers. In their business
model, a controller might invest in a few topcoders at a time, however, she can potentially get access
to updated rankings (quality and time to complete tasks) via topcoder competitions over time. In
server applications such as Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure as well, although a controller might
be optimizing operations on a local set of servers, they can request task performance data from a
centralized server or a scheduler after a delay in time [35]. This feedback model already presents
with technical challenges due to random completion times, as we discuss next.
In order to design the online learning algorithm, let us define, for any (k, t) ∈ [K]× T, the empirical
estimates of the mean completion time and reward after n stages, respectively, as
µ̂k,n(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
min{t,Xk,i}, and θ̂k,n(t) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
Rk,i(t).
Definition 4 (OLUM Algorithm). For any k, let Qk,0 = 1 and Qk,i be defined recursively as follows:
Qk,i+1 =
(
Qk,i + γk(i) min{XGi,i, Ti} −Rk,i(Ti)I{Gi = k}
)+
, i > 0 (6)
where the auxiliary variable γk(i) =
(
U ′k
)−1(
Qk,i/V
)
, where V > 0 is a design choice. Then, for
the task n, the OLUM Algorithm, denoted by piOLUM, makes the following decision:
(Gn, Tn) ∈ arg max
(k,t)∈[K]×T
θ̂k,n−τ (t)Qk,n
µ̂k,n−τ (t)
.
Upon observing the corresponding feedback, the controller updates Qk,n+1 via (6).
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Interpretation: The OLUM Algorithm aims to maximize the time-average reward weighted with Qk,n
at each round. Note that for any k ∈ [K], if the sequence Qk,n gets very big, then its reward rate is
much smaller than the optimal value, thus the controller tends to select that group. In other words, the
magnitude of Qk,n is a measure of the unfairness that group k has endured by stage n. The algorithm
is designed so as to balance the weights Qk,n to maximize the total utility.
In the following theorem, we prove regret bounds for the OLUM Algorithm.
Theorem 1 (Regret bounds for OLUM). For any V > 0 and constant delay τ , the regret under piOLUM
is bounded as REGΠS
piOLUM(B) = O
(√
log(B)
B +
V
B +
1
V
)
. By choosing V = Θ(
√
B/ log(B)), we
obtain REGΠS
piOLUM(B) = O(
√
log(B)/B) = O˜(1/
√
B).
The proof is based on PAC bounds and stochastic dual optimization, and can be found in Appendix E.
5 Simulations
We implemented the OLUM Algorithm on a fair resource allocation problem with K = 2 groups.
In the application domains that we considered in Section 2, the task completion times naturally
follow a power-law distribution. For example, in the server allocation example, empirical studies
indicate that the distribution of job execution times can be accurately approximated by a Pareto(1,
γ) distribution with exponent γ ∈ (0, 2) [36]. Similarly, for the contractual online hiring setting,
creativity of individuals has been shown to follow a Pareto(1, γ) distribution with exponent γ > 1,
where γ is dependent on the field of expertise [37]. Motivated by these applications, we consider the
following group statistics:
• Group 1: Xk,n ∼ Pareto(1, 1.2) and Rk,n(t) = X0.6k,n · I{Xk,n ≤ t}
• Group 2: Xk,n ∼ Pareto(1, 1.4) and Rk,n(t) = X0.2k,n · I{Xk,n ≤ t}
The reward per processing time as a function of the deadline is shown in Figure 2. Note that the
optimal deadline improves the reward per unit processing time. For this setting, we implemented the
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Figure 2: (Left) Reward per processing time for each group. (Right) Fraction of time budget assigned to
Group-2 individuals under the OLUM Algorithm for various fairness criteria.
OLUM Algorithm with parameter V = 20, and considered α-fair resource allocation problems with
various α values. In Figure 2, we present the simulation results for ϕ2, i.e., the average fraction of
time budget B allocated to Group-2 individuals, under the OLUM Algorithm. For these experiments,
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we chose wk = 1 for k = 1, 2 and ran the OLUM Algorithm for 1000 trials for each set. Note that the
optimal reward per processing time of Group-1 individuals is higher than that of Group-2 individuals,
thus Group-1 is chosen for reward maximization. Under proportional fairness, the time budget is
equally distributed between Group-1 and Group-2 individuals. We observe from Figure 2 that the
OLUM Algorithm converges to the optimal operating points very fast, which verifies the theoretical
results we presented.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a versatile and comprehensive framework for continuous-time online
resource allocation with fairness considerations, and proposed a no-regret learning algorithm for
this problem in a delayed full-information feedback model. Note that although the full-information
feedback is available in many application scenarios, there are cases in which the controller does not
have an access to full feedback, thus a mechanism that incorporates bandit feedback is required. The
online learning framework introduced in this paper can be extended to bandit feedback. One way to
achieve this might be to replace the empirical estimates with upper confidence bounds in the OLUM
Algorithm, which makes the analysis even more complicated. We leave the design and analysis of
bandit algorithms in this setting as a future work.
Broader Impact
Our work develops the theory of fair online learning, specifically analyzing the impact of reward-
maximizing allocation policies on opportunities for different groups of people. Our proposal analyzes
the trade-offs across various allocation policies (ranging from profit maximizing to equal opportunity
for all), thus highlighting the choice of objectives that the controllers should carefully consider. This
work does not have any foreseeable negative ethical or societal impact.
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A Related Work
Fair resource allocation via utility maximization has been widely studied in economics [38, 39,
18], mechanism design [40], network management [15, 41, 16, 12, 42] among many other fields.
Particularly, logarithmic utility maximization was introduced in [38] for the "Nash bargaining
solution" to a bargaining game among multiple players over the allocation of a shared resource, and it
was used in the management of communication networks in [41]. As a unifying framework, the class
of α-fair (also known as "isoelastic") utility functions was proposed for fair allocation in economics
in [39]. The main methodology for fair resource allocation in time-varying dynamical systems,
akin to the system considered here, is Lyapunov drift analysis. Lyapunov drift has been used as a
fundamental design and analysis tool in many problems including the wireless scheduling problem
[43, 44], fair resource allocation among competing users [16, 12], stochastic game theory [45].
Based on Lyapunov-drift methods, stochastic dynamic optimization algorithms by using the so-called
drift-plus-penalty method were widely used in queueing and networking problems (see [46] and
references therein). The existing Lyapunov optimization methods are predominantly opportunistic,
which means that the random quantities (such as completion time, reward, system state) arrive prior
to the decision-making at each stage, or they assume the knowledge of the first- and second-order
statistics of these random quantities. These assumptions are not satisfied in many applications as
we discussed in Section 1, therefore the controller must learn the statistics so as to maximize the
objective function, such as the total utility. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first learning
theory approach to the fair resource allocation problem based on Lyapunov drift. Even in the offline
optimization setting, the Lyapunov optimization methods are predominantly in discrete-time setting,
i.e., each action takes a unit time. The only continuous-time utility maximization approach to fair
resource allocation is [19], which assumes the knowledge of first-order statistics. Our paper improves
some of the results of this paper in the offline optimization scenario (e.g., simplified decision rules,
finite-time performance bounds), and extends these results for the online learning problem.
The online learning problem under budget constraints has been considered in the bandits with
knapsacks (BwK) framework [20]. In this extension of the classical stochastic bandit model, each
action consumes a random amount of a resource from a common budget and yields a random reward,
where the controller aims to maximize the expected total reward by until a resource is completely
depleted. BwK model has been considered under various dynamics [20, 47, 48, 21]. In [23], an
interrupt/deadline mechanism is employed to incorporate the continuous-time dynamics into the
budget-constrained online learning model. For a detailed discussion of the BwK and its extensions,
please refer to [22]. The original BwK models study the reward maximization problem. In [24], the
authors consider an online learning setting where the objective is to maximize a concave function
subject to convex constraints. In [24], the decision-making process continues for a fixed number of
stages, and the constraints are not always satisfied unlike our model. Instead, the distance to the
constraint set, as well as the regret, is shown to vanish in expectation under the proposed learning
algorithms, which require solving linear programs at each stage. Another crucial difference is
that the deadline mechanism for improving time-efficiency is not incorporated into the decision
in [24]. Our paper deviates from this line of work as it proposes a versatile and comprehensive
framework for fairness, and incorporates continuous-time dynamics into the decision-making for
time-efficiency under strict time constraints. To solve this problem, we propose a learning algorithm
with low computational complexity, and prove its efficiency. The design and analysis methodology we
followed in this paper based on Lyapunov optimization can be used in many other problem models.
B Proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix any (group, deadline) decision (k, t) ∈ [K] × T, and consider the
stationary policy pi = pi(P ) with an arbitrary probability distribution P . Let the number of (k, t)
decisions in [0, B] be defined as
N (k,t)pi (B) =
Npi(P )(B)∑
n=1
I{pin = (k, t)}.
Since each decision is made independently according to the same probability distribution, the number
of tasks between two consecutive tasks for which the decision is (k, t) is iid, which implies that
N
(k,t)
pi (B) is a regenerative process [34]. Therefore, we can compute the total reward gathered from
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tasks for which the decision-pair is (k, t) by using renewal theory. In order to accomplish this, we will
compute the mean length of a regenerative cycle for each decision (k, t), and then use the renewal
theory for tight bounds.
Without loss of generality, consider a regenerative cycle from the beginning (time 0) to the completion
of the first task where the decision-pair is (k, t), thus each regenerative cycle contains exactly
one task for which the decision-pair is (k, t). Then, for the random variable M = sup{n ≥ 0 :
pin(P ) 6= (k, t)}, the number of tasks in a regenerative cycle is M + 1 ∼ Geo
(
P (k, t)
)
. This
construction implies that {M = 0} = {pi1(P ) = (k, t)} and {M = m} =
⋂m
i=1{pii(P ) 6=
(k, t)} ∩ {piM+1(P ) = (k, t)} for m > 1 under the stationary randomized policy pi(P ). Therefore,
the length of the regenerative cycle (i.e., the time interval in which there is exactly one completed
task with decision-pair (k, t)) is as follows:
Y =
M∑
n=1
∑
(k′,t′)6=(k,t)
I{pin = (k′, t′)}(Xk′,n ∧ t′) + (Xk,M ∧ t),
where x ∧ y = min{x, y} for any two real numbers x, y. Note that Y is a stopped random walk with
non-i.i.d. increments and a controlled stopping time M + 1. We will compute the expectation of this
quantity first. By iterated expectation, we have the following equality:
E[Y ] =
∞∑
n0=0
P(M = n0)E[Y |M = n0]. (7)
Note that for any n0 ≥ 0, we have:
E[I{pin = (k′, t′)}|M = n0] = P(pin = (k′, t′)|pin 6= (k, t)) = P (k
′, t′)
1− P (k, t) ,
for all n ≤ n0. Therefore, we have the following identity:
E[Y |M = n0] = n0
∑
(k′,t′)6=(k,t)
P (k′, t′)µ(k′, t′)
1− P (k, t) + µ(k, t), ∀n0 ≤ 0, (8)
where µ(k, t) = E[Xk,1 ∧ t]. Thus, we have the following:
E[Y ] =
∞∑
n0=0
P(M = n0)n0
∑
(k′,t′)6=(k,t)
p(k′, t′)µ(k′, t′)
1− p(k, t) + µ(k, t),
= E[M ]
∑
(k′,t′) 6=(k,t)
p(k′, t′)µ(k′, t′)
1− p(k, t) + µ(k, t).
from (7). Since M + 1 ∼ Geo(P (k, t)), we have E[M ] = 1p(k,t) − 1. Substituting this into the above
identity, we find the expected length of a regenerative cycle under pi(P ) as follows:
E[Y ] =
∑
k′,t′)6=(k,t) P (k
′, t′)µ(k′, t′)
P (k, t)
.
In summary, a decision-pair (k, t) is chosen once in a cycle of Y time units, and yields a reward
Rk,n(t) under the stationary randomized policy pi(P ). Having specificed mean length of a regenera-
tive cycle and mean reward, we can now compute the reward rate (i.e., reward per unit time) for a
decision-pair (k, t) under pi(P ) as follows:
rk(t) =
E[Rk,1(t)]
E[Y ]
=
P (k, t)E[Rk,1(t)]∑
(i,t′)∈[K]×T P (i, t′)E[min{Xi,1, t′}]
.
As an immediate consequence, the reward per unit time for group k under pi(P ) is as follows:
ρk(P ) =
∑
t∈T
rk(t).
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As a consequence of the elementary renewal theorem [49], the total reward for group k under pi(P )
in [0, B] is Bρk(P ) + o(B). In order to get tight bounds, we use Lorden’s inequality to obtain the
following inequalities:
Bρk(P ) ≤
Npi(B)∑
n=1
∑
t∈T
I{pin = (k, t)}Rk,n(t) ≤ Bρk(P ) + C(k, t),
for a constant C(k, t) < ∞ since V ar(Xk,n ∧ t) < ∞ and V ar(Rk,n(t)) < ∞ for all t ∈ T [34].
Therefore,
ρk(P ) ≤ rpik (B) ≤ ρk(P ) +
C(k, t)
B
.
Since Uk is continuously differentiable and concave, we have the following result:
Uk(ρk(P )) ≤ Uk(rpik (B)) ≤ Uk(ρk(P )) + U ′k
(
ρk(P )
)C(k, t)
B
,
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we will show an approximation to the optimization problem in (3)
based on Jensen’s inequality.
Lemma 1. For any k ∈ [K], n ≥ 1 and a causal policy pi for choosing (Gn, Tn, (γk,n)k∈[K]), let
X˜pin,n = min{XGn,n, Tn}, (9)
Zpin,n = min{XGn,n, Tn}
K∑
m=1
Um(γm,n), (10)
Ypin,m,n = min{XGn,n, Tn}γm,n −Rm,n(Tn)I{Gn = m}, ∀m ∈ [K]. (11)
Let U∗ be the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
pi∈ΠA
lim
N→∞
∑N
n=1 E[Zpin,n]∑N
n=1 E[X˜pin,n]
s.t. lim
N→∞
∑N
n=1 E[Ypin,m,n]∑N
n=1 E[X˜pin,n]
≤ 0, ∀m = 1, 2, . . . ,K. (12)
where the maximization is over ΠA, the set of all causal policies. Then, we have the following result:
lim
B→∞
OPTΠA(B) = U
∗.
Proof. First, under any policy pi ∈ ΠA, the following holds by the definition of Npi(B):
Npi(B)−1∑
n=1
X˜pin,n < B ≤
Npi(B)∑
n=1
X˜pin,n.
Since X˜pin,n is bounded for all n, we have the following:
lim
B→∞
rpik (B) = lim
B→∞
E
[∑Npi(B)
n=1 I{Gn = k}Rk,n(Tn)
]
E
[∑Npi(B)
n=1 X˜pin,n
] (13)
By using the asymptotic equality in (13), continuity of Uk, and a direct application of the extended
Jensen’s inequality (see Lemma 7.6 in [46]), we have limB→∞ OPTΠA(B) = U
∗. This enables us to
convert the utility maximization problem into a constrained optimization for time-averages.
Now, we will prove the following:
max
P
∑
k∈[K]
Uk
(
ρk(P )
)
= U∗.
Since U∗ is optimal asymptotic total utility over ΠA ⊃ ΠS , we have the following inequality:
max
P
∑
k∈[K]
Uk
(
ρk(P )
) ≤ U∗.
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By using (13), a direct application of Lemma 1 in [19] implies that there exists an SRP pi(P0) that
achieves U∗. Proposition 2 implies that∑
k
Uk(r
pi(P ′)
k (B)) ≤ maxP
∑
k
Uk(ρk(P )) +O(1/B),
for any P ′ and B > 0. Thus, we have:
U∗ = lim
B→∞
∑
k
Uk
(
r
pi(P0)
k (B)
)
≤ max
P
∑
k
Uk(ρk(P )),
which implies U∗ = maxP
∑
k Uk(ρk(P )).
C Proof of Proposition 3
Let µ(k, t) = E[min{Xk,1, t}] and θ(k, t) = E[Rk,1(t)]. For the optimal distribution P ?, let
Ck =
∑
k′ 6=k
∑
t∈T
P ?(k′, t)µ(k′, t),
P ?k = [P
?(k, t)]t∈T and pk =
∑
t∈T P
?(k, t). Then, since Uk(x) is an increasing function of x, P ?k
is the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
Pk
∑
t Pk(t)θ(k, t)∑
t Pk(t)µ(k, t) + Ck
subject to Pk(t) ≥ 0,∀t,∑
t
Pk(t) = pk.
(14)
Let V ∗ be the optimum solution of (14), and V (Pk) =
∑
t Pk(t)θ(k, t) − V ∗
(∑
t Pk(t)µ(k, t) +
Ck
)
. Then, the following optimization problem is equivalent to (3):
max
Pk
V (Pk) subject to Pk(t) ≥ 0,∀t,∑
t
Pk(t) = pk,
(15)
which, in turn, yields P ?k . For any t ∈ T, we have ∂V∂Pk(t) = θ(k, t)− V ∗µ(k, t). Let
d∗ = max
t
∂V (Pk)
∂Pk(t)
∣∣∣
Pk=P?k
.
By the optimality of P ?k , if P
?
k (t) > 0, then we must have ∂V (P
?
k )/∂Pk(t) = d
∗, which further
implies that
P ?k (t) > 0⇒ θ(k, t) = d∗ + V ∗µ(k, t). (16)
Let t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tm be the set of deadlines such that P ?k (ti) > 0. There exists a β ∈ [0, 1] such
that the following holds:∑
t
P ?k (t)θ(k, t) = pk
(
βθ(k, t1) + (1− β)θ(k, tm)
)
.
In conjunction with (16), this implies that:∑
t
P ?k (t)µ(k, t) = pk
(
βµ(k, t1) + (1− β)µ(k, tm)
)
.
Hence, we have shown that P ?k makes a randomization between at most two deadlines, which
simplifies (15) considerably as a function of a single variable β ∈ [0, 1]. Rewriting (15) in terms of β
and taking the derivative with respect to β ∈ [0, 1], we observe that the objective function is either
monotonically decreasing or increasing with β. Therefore, P ?k has only one non-zero element, i.e.,
the deadline decision is made deterministically for group k.
15
D Proof of Proposition 4
By Proposition 3, for each group k, there is a unique optimal deadline t∗k. Let
r∗k =
E[Rk,n(t∗k)]
E[min{Xk,n, t∗k}]
,
be the reward per processing time for group k under the optimal deadline selection. Then, by
Proposition 2, we can express the reward per unit time as follows:
ρk(P ) = r
∗
kϕ̂k(P ),
where
ϕ̂k(P ) =
P (k, t∗k)E[min{Xk,n, t∗k}]∑
j∈[K] P (j, t
∗
j )E[min{Xj,n, t∗j}]
,
is the fraction of time allocated to group k under pi(P ). Note that for any P , {ϕ̂k(P ) : k ∈ [K]}
defines a probability distribution in the K-dimensional simplex. Therefore, by Proposition 2, the
asymptotically optimal utility is the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
ϕ∈RK+
∑
k∈[K]
Uk(r
∗
kϕ̂k) s.t.
∑
k∈[K]
ϕ̂k = 1,
ϕ̂k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ [K].
(17)
The Lagrangian function associated with (17) is as follows:
L(ϕ̂, λ) =
∑
k∈[K]
Uk(r
∗
kϕ̂k)− λ
( ∑
k∈[K]
ϕ̂k − 1
)
.
Since Uk is a monotonically increasing and continuously differentiable function for all k, by solving
∂L
∂ϕ̂k
= 0, we obtain ϕ̂k = (U ′k)
−1(λ/r∗k). As Uk is concave for all k, the proof follows by applying
KKT conditions.
E Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of two steps. In the first step, we analyze the performance of the
OLUM Algorithm for the constrained optimization of time averages for any number of trials N by
using a drift-based dual ascent optimization methodology. In the second step, we show that the
number of tasks processed in [0, B] is O(B) with high probability to prove the regret result.
The following concentration inequality will be used extensively throughout the proof.
Lemma 2 ([50, 23]). Let Xn and Rn be two sub-Gaussian random processes with means E[X] > 0,
E[R], and parameters σ2X and σ2R, respectively. Then, for any  ∈ (0,E[X]), we have the following:
P
(∣∣∣∑ni=1Ri∑n
i=1Xi
− E[R]
E[X]
∣∣∣ > (1 + r)
µ
)
≤ 2(e−n2/σ2X + e−n2/σ2R), (18)
for any r > E[R]E[X] and µ ≤ E[X]− .
Note that any bounded random variable Z ∈ [0, a] is sub-Gaussian with parameter σ2 = a2/4 [51].
As we are dealing with bounded min{Xk,n, t} and Rk,n(t), Lemma 2 is an essential result for the
proofs in this section.
In the second lemma, we provide an upper bound for the expectation of the dual variables Qn =
(Q1,n, Q2,n, . . . , QK,n).
Lemma 3. Consider the dual variables defined in (6) under the OLUM Algorithm, and without loss of
generality assume Qk,0 = 1 for all k. Then, we have the following bound for any n ≥ 1:
E[
K∑
k=1
Qk,n] ≤ V
∑
k∈[K]
U ′k
(mink,t E[Rk,n(t)]− 
maxk∈[K] E[Xk,n]
)
+O(1/), (19)
for any V > 0 and  ∈ (0,mink,t E[Rk,n(t)).
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Proof. For any  ∈ (0,mink,t E[Rk,n(t)), let
A = {q :
∑
k
qk ≥ V
∑
k∈[K]
U ′k
(mink,t E[Rk,n(t)]− 
maxk∈[K] E[Xk,n]
)
+ max
t
Rmax(t)}.
Then, we have E[
∑
kQk,n+1−
∑
kQk,n|Qn ∈ A] ≤ −. Also, note that Qk,n+1−Qk,n is bounded
almost surely, i.e., sub-Gaussian. Thus, Theorem 2.3 in [52] implies the tail bounds for
∑
kQk,n,
which implies the result via E[XI{X > a}] = aP(X > a) + ∫∞
a
P(X > x)dx.
Step 1: Recall the equivalent form of the utility maximization problem in Lemma 1. In this step, we
will prove the following result under the OLUM Algorithm:
E[
∑N
n=1 Zpin,n]
E[
∑N
n=1 X˜pin,n]
≥ U∗ −O
(√ log(N)
N
+
1
V
)
,
E[
∑N
n=1 Ypin,m,n]
E[
∑N
n=1 X˜pin,n]
≤ O(V/N), m = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
for any N . This will be done by showing that the OLUM Algorithm achieves -optimal Lyapunov drift
with high probability for each decision, thus achieves optimality fast as a result of the Lyapunov drift
methodology. For details on Lyapunov optimization, refer to [46].
For any group k ∈ [K], let
X∗k,n = min{XGn,n, t∗k},
Z∗k,n = min{Xk,n, t∗k}
K∑
m=1
Um(γm,n),
Y ∗k,m,n = min{Xk,n, t∗k}γm,n −Rm,n(t∗m)I{k = m}, ∀m ∈ [K].
Note that these are the random variables in Lemma 1 under the optimal deadline t∗k for each group k.
The proof relies on a novel online learning approach based on drift-based optimization techniques.
In this methodology, the dual variables Qn as defined in (6) summarize how much the constraint is
violated in the past. At stage n, given the vector of dual variables Qn, we have the drift-plus-penalty
ratio (DPPR), which is defined as follows:
Ψn(k,Qn) = −V
E[Z∗k,n]
E[min{Xk,n, t∗k}]
+
∑
m
Qm,n
E[Y ∗k,m,n]
E[min{Xk,n, t∗k}]
. (20)
The optimal algorithm therefore, aims to minimize the DPPR to achieve optimality. Let the terms in
DPPR related to the auxiliary variables γm,n be denoted as:
ψn(γn, Qn) =
K∑
m=1
(− V Um(γm,n) +Qm,nγm,n). (21)
Therefore, the DPPR can be written as follows:
Ψn(k,Qn) = ψn(γn, Qn)−Qk,n E[Rk,n(t
∗
k)]
E[min{Xk,n, t∗k}]
. (22)
The classical drift-based stochastic optimization techniques either assume the knowledge of the
first-order moments in Ψn(k,Gn), or they observe the outcomes for the completion of task n prior
to the decision. However, in online learning, since we have no prior knowledge of the mean values
E[Rm,n(t∗m)] and E[min{Xk,n, t∗k}], we define the empirical reward-per-processing-time as follows:
r̂k,n(t) =
∑n−τ
i=1 Rk,i(t)∑n−τ
i=1 min{Xk,i, t}
. (23)
where n− τ is the number of samples available. Similarly, let
rk(t) =
E[Rk,i(t)]
E[min{Xk,i, t}] . (24)
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The deadline is chosen so as to maximize the reward per processing time:
r̂k,n = max
t∈T
r̂k,n(t).
Let δk(t) = maxt′ rk(t′)− rk(t) and δ(t) = min(k,t):δk(t)>0 δk(t). By using Lemma 2, it can be
shown that Tn = t∗Gn with probability at least 1 − e−nΩ
(
δ2(t)
)
, i.e., the optimal deadline for the
chosen group Gn is selected with high probability. With this deadline-selection policy, the empirical
drift-plus-penalty ratio (e-DPPR) is defined as follows:
Ψ̂n(k,Qn) = ψn(γn, Qn)−Qk,nr̂k,n. (25)
The OLUM Algorithm as defined in Definition 4 is based on minimizing the e-DPPR in (25). The
auxiliary variables in the OLUM Algorithm is chosen to maximize ψn(γn, Qn) over γn, and the group
decision is independent of the choice of the auxiliary variables given Qn.
The following proposition quantifies the approximation error for using the e-DPPR in the decision-
making as a surrogate for the DPPR in the optimization.
Proposition 6. For any given  ∈ (0, µ∗), we have the following inequality for the DPPR under the
OLUM Algorithm:
Ψn(Gn, Qn) ≤ min
k∈[K]
Ψn(k,Qn) +
2(1 + r∗)
µ∗ − 
∑
k
Qk,n + h(Qn)O(n), (26)
where E[h(Qn)] = c1e−c2n
2
for some constants c1, c2 > 0 and
r∗ = max
(k,t)
E[Rk,n(t)]
E[min{Xk,nt}] .
The proof of Proposition 6 relies on the concentration result presented in Lemma 2 and a PAC-type
bound: let k be a group such that Ψn(k,Qn) > minj Ψn(j,Qn) + δ for any δ > 0 given Qn. Then,
P
(
Gn = k
∣∣Qn) ≤ P(∣∣Ψ̂n(k,Qn)−Ψn(k,Qn)∣∣ > δ/2∣∣Qn)
+ P
(∣∣Ψ̂n(kn, Qn)−Ψn(kn, Qn)∣∣ > δ/2∣∣Qn),
where kn = arg minj Ψn(j,Qn). Then, a straightforward application of Lemma 2 and union bound
(over suboptimal groups) with δ =  ·O(∑kQk,n) for  > 0 yield the result.
We have the following lemma, which will be key in the analysis of the learning algorithm.
Lemma 4 ([46]). Let L(q) = 12
∑K
m=1 q
2
m be the quadratic Lyapunov function, and
∆(Qn) = E[L(Qn+1)− L(Qn)|Qn],
be the Lyapunov drift. Then, we have the following bound on the Lyapunov drift for the problem (12):
∆(Qn) ≤ D + E[
∑
k∈[K]
Qk,nYGn,k,n
∣∣Qn], (27)
for some constant D > 0 under the OLUM Algorithm.
From Proposition 6 and Lemma 4 with  = n =
2(1+r∗)
µ∗
√
β log(n)
n for β > 2, we have the following
result:
∆(Qn)− V E[min{XGn,n, Tn}
∑
k
Uk(γk,n)|Qn] ≤ D
+ E[min{XGn,n, Tn}|Qn]
(
− V U∗ + n
∑
k
Qk,n + E[h(Qn)|Qn]O(K · n)
)
. (28)
where D > 0 is a constant, and the RHS holds since there exists an optimal stationary randomized
policy for (12) which satisfies:
min
k
Ψ(k,Qn) ≤ Ψ(G˜n, Qn) = −V U∗.
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Taking the expectation in (28), we have:
E[L(Qn+1)− L(Qn)]− V E[min{XGn,n, Tn}
∑
k
Uk(γk,n)] ≤ B − V U∗E[min{XGn,n, Tn}]
+ n max
k∈[K]
E[Xk,n]
∑
k∈[K]
E[Qk,n] +O(K)n1−β , (29)
Summing the above over n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, dividing by N , and rearranging terms, we have the
following inequality:
E[
∑N
n=1 Zpin,n]
E[
∑N
n=1 X˜pin,n]
≥ U∗ − 2(1 + r
∗)
µ∗
O
(√β log(N)
N
)
+
D/µ∗ +O(Nβ−2)
V
+
E[L(Q0)]
V µ∗N
. (30)
The second question we had was how much the constraint in (12) is violated. From the update of the
dual variables (6), we have the following:
Qk,n+1 ≥ Qk,n + Ypin,k,n, (31)
Summing the above over all n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, we have:
Qk,N ≥ Qk,0 +
N∑
n=1
YGn,k,n.
Thus, we have:
E[Qk,N ]
Nµ∗
≥ E[
∑N
n=1 Ypin,k,n]
E[
∑N
n=1 min{XGn,n, Tn}]
. (32)
By Lemma 3, the following inequality holds:
E[Qk,N ]
N
≤ O
(V
N
)
.
Hence, by choosing V = Θ(
√
N/ log(N)), we show that the objective is achieved with
O(
√
log(N)/N) gap, and the constraint is satisfied at a rate O(1/
√
N log(N)).
Step 2. In this step, we will show that the decision-making process continues for Npi(B) = Θ(B)
stages with high probability, which will conclude the proof.
For any B > 0, let n0(B) = d2B/µmine. Then, under any causal policy pi, we have the following
bound:
REGpiΠS (B) = U
∗ − E[
∑Npi(B)
n=1 Zpin,n]
B
,
≤ U∗ − E[
∑Npi(B)
n=1 Zpin,n]
E[
∑Npi(B)
n=1 X˜pin,n]
, (33)
≤ µ
∗ · n0(B)
B
(
U∗ − E[
∑n0(B)
n=1 Zpin,n]
E[
∑n0(B)
n=1 X˜pin,n]
+ o(1)
)
, (34)
where U∗ = OPTΠS (B) +O(1/B) is the optimal utility in Lemma 1, µ
∗ = maxk E[Xk,n], and (33)
holds since
∑Npi(B)
n=1 XGn,n ≥ B by definition. In order to prove (34), first note that
E
[Npi(B)∑
n=1
(
U∗X˜pin,n − Zpin,n
)]
= E
[ ∞∑
n=1
(
U∗X˜pin,n − Zpin,n
)
I{Npi(B) > n}
]
,
≤ E
[ n0(B)∑
n=1
(
U∗X˜pin,n − Zpin,n
)]
+ U∗
∑
n>n0(B)
P(Npi(B) > n)
(35)
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Since {Npi(B) > n} ⊂ {∑ni=1 X˜pii,i < B} by definition and E[X˜pii,i|Hi] ≥ µ∗ > 0 for all i, we
have:
P(Npi(B) > n) = P(
n∑
i=1
X˜pii,i < B) ≤ e−nΩ(1),
for all n > n0(B) by Azuma-Hoeffding inequality [51], which implies that n0(B) is a high-
probability upper bound for Npi(B) under any causal policy pi. In other words, the decision-making
process continues for at most n0(B) turns with high probability since each action depletes a positive
amount from the time budget B. Consequently, we have∑
n>n0(B)
P(Npi(B) > n) ≤ e−Ω(B) = o(1).
Using this result and rearranging the terms in (35), we obtain the inequality in (34). Furthermore, the
constraints are satisfied at rate O(V/B) for all groups. Therefore, by using the result of Step 1 with
N = n0(B) and noting that n0(B)/B = Θ(1), we conclude that REGpiΠS (B) = O(
√
log(B)/B).
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